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Why, I wondered, did Organization Studies want someone to review a book, written by a 
philosopher, about evolutionary biology? Why did I leap at the chance?  
The second was easy: Years ago, while learning about corporate governance, I found a 
mention of a “theory of lesser peaks”. I have lost the reference, sadly, but it is related to 
institutions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and path dependence (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999), and a 
remark by Amartya Sen (2006) about eschewing the pursuit of an “ideal” form of justice. It 
suggests that the fear and cost of descending from a lesser peak inhibits us from achieving 
even greater heights. For example, having achieved pretty good corporate governance, do you 
want to risk losing those gains for the sake, after another, even longer climb, to try a different 
system? Why not settle for something good enough? 
The clue to answering the first question is the final word in the subtitle of this charmingly 
accessible book. Scholars have long sought analogies from other fields, including organisms, 
to explain the non-natural world of organizations that Gareth Morgan (1997) famously 
catalogued. While the meat of Daniel Milo’s book focuses on biology and our (and Darwin’s) 
flawed understanding of the theory of natural selection, it is bookended by chapters that hint 
at, rather than develop, a more all-embracing application, across social interactions, economic 
affairs and the nature of organizations.  
Its discussion of biology demonstrates, through repeated examples, that the outcome of 
natural selection is not continuing improvement. Let’s consider just one: After an introductory 
chapter outlining his argument, Milo turns in Chapter 1 to the giraffe. Giraffes cannot be the 
product of ever-better adaptation to their environment. The common explanation, and the one 
used by Darwinians for many years, is that their long necks allowed the giraffe to feast on 
leaves inaccessible to shorter creatures. Such an adaptation would surely benefit them, 
especially during periods of limited rainfall.  
Sadly, for the theorists, the data from field studies show something else. Giraffes don’t 
feed much at the greatest height, and during droughts, they feed from lower branches or the 
ground. Nor do their long, strong necks seem to facilitate reproduction. If natural selection is 
right, why didn’t these awkward creatures – which have difficulty drinking water, running, 
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kneeling to rest or sleep, or engaging in intercourse – succumb to the drawback of such 
maladaptation?  
Natural selection does occur, Milo agrees, but it is not alone in driving speciation or 
variation within species. Favorable mutations improve the chances of survival, yes, but they 
often come alongside other changes in DNA that increase variety without necessarily helping 
the creature survive. Mutation is random. Some variants may even be worse, but not bad 
enough to inhibit their heritability and persistence through generations. Indeed, studies in 
natural history, detailed through most of the book’s 10 chapters, suggest that nature favors 
persistence over change, unless, by luck, a change is helpful in the context of some shift in the 
environment.  
Take humans. Homo sapiens survive, even dominate the earth, despite their many 
maladaptations. It’s not just their lack of body hair, their susceptibility to disease, their slow 
gait or merely modest strength that make them unsuited in a contest for survival of the fittest. 
Think of the long gestation period of their offspring, and then the much longer period of 
development before their young can walk, let alone feed themselves and reproduce. And then 
there’s their long life after their fertility has dimmed. Surely natural selection, as recorded in 
what Milo calls the “domestication fallacy” in Darwin, would have de-selected beasts that live 
long lives and continue to absorb resources, while engaging only in recreational rather than 
reproductive sex.  
One of those random adaptations that arrived along with the lack of body hair, limited 
muscular strength and other lost benefits was a very powerful brain. Theirs is a brain that can 
solve problems, remember much of what happened in the past, and, most importantly, imagine 
the future. This imagination, Milo argues, may be the key to understanding why homo sapiens 
left Africa to seek out other domains in ways the other humanoids did only modestly and much 
less successfully. It accounts for our need for ever greater variety and novelty, our thirst for 
innovation and experimentation – for things that don’t help the fittest survive. 
The book’s final chapter then seeks to draw social and economic conclusions from the 
biological base it builds. For example, in its closing pages, we read: 
Imperatives such as innovate or die and be competitive are strongly 
connected to natural selection as described by Darwinism and neo-
Darwinism but feebly connected to natural selection as it actually operates 
(Milo, 2019, p. 249, emphasis in the original) 
Darwinism and neo-Darwinism have much in common with neoliberalism, he asserts. “If 
evolutionary thought all too easily naturalizes capitalism’s competitive zeal, it is because 
Darwin was only partly right” (Milo, 2019, p. 2).  
If how natural selection “actually operates” through accident, randomness and luck, 
generating mediocrity or worse more often than excellence, then perhaps we are misguided to 
think that homo economicus is a product of nature or a goal to achieve. Perhaps organizations 
are mistaken to strive, always, to be competitive. Or indeed to innovate, an exercise at odds 
with the efficiency we often hear is central to being competitive.  
Building on Milo’s version of biological history, we can revise our image of organizations 
as organisms. It can explain why many small businesses persist, over generations, without 
constant improvement. They are “good enough”, at least until something radical happens. It 
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may explain why charities attract volunteers, why social enterprises seek something other than 
greater profitability, as well as why we enjoy the useless activity of elaborate team sports, 
leagues and the international organizations that run them. We value them, perhaps, not 
principally for the business opportunities they represent. 
It also suggests reasons why, in complex organizations, facing complex decision-making, 
we should expect – even accept – failures, because circumstances arise when innovate or die 
is associated with natural selection, and when to be competitive is vital. We just can’t be sure 
when they are coming, or from which direction.  
And how might we organize and then govern those organizations? Milo’s view of biology 
points us away from seeking perfection and even perfectibility. It points instead towards 
sticking with what works until it doesn’t and accepting what’s “good enough”, while tolerating 
and even embracing experiments that don’t cause too much harm. Corporate governance might 
need only to be “reasonably good” (Nordberg, 2018). Imagination will then take care of the 
rest, until it doesn’t. As for a philosophy of organization, the philosopher Milo seems to favor 
pragmatism over the utilitarian, and the utilitarian over the ideal. The rest is luck. 
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